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motivation, involving a belief that sorting at home is more thorough than central sorting.
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1 Introduction
What determines people’s decisions to participate in “pro-environment” behaviours such as
recycling or volunteering for a local conservation group? In the specific context of recycling, a
considerable empirical literature (Iyer and Kashyap 2007; Nixon and Saphores 2009; Nigbur
et al. 2010) points to factors such as the costs of alternative waste disposal options, the nature
of facilities available for recycling, and the role of self-image and social pressures. However,
certain aspects of households’ motivation to recycle are apparently not yet fully understood.
A simple economic calculation would suggest that, unless the effort to sort waste into
different categories for recycling (paper, cans, bottles, compostables etc.) saves money or
generates other private benefits, then less home sorting would be preferred to more, as long
as effort is costly. In a recent stated preference study of households in Poland, however,
Czajkowski et al. (2014) found that a substantial share of respondents prefer to home sort
into more categories as part of a municipal recycling programme, even when (1) this is
costly to them (in terms of time and inconvenience) and (2) when the alternatives offered to
individuals involved the same level of sorting, but performed by the municipal authority at a
central waste handling facility instead. But why?
The data available to Czajkowski et al. (2014) did not permit them to explain statistically
what kind of benefits caused some individuals to prefer waste collection contracts requiring
higher levels of home sorting. This paper is an attempt to provide such explanations. In what
follows, we present results from a new study using the same discrete choice experiment
design as in Czajkowski et al. (2014), but with more attitudinal and de-briefing questions
devoted to investigating why some people prefer at-home recycling compared with recycling
in a central sorting facility. This allows us to jointly consider the relative effects of social
pressures, individual moral motivations and the factors such as how troublesome or satisfying
recycling is to respondents.
Due to possible self-selection bias, we cannot claim that our sample is representative of
the population; nevertheless, it provides an interesting opportunity to study the underlying
motives for household recycling. Like Czajkowski et al. (2014), we find that a substantial
share of respondents prefer to sort themselves; in fact, 84 % prefer to sort into two categories
rather than not sort at all, while 70 % prefer sorting into five categories compared with no
sorting.1 This contrasts with Bruvoll et al. (2002), who found that 72 % of their respondents
preferred central facility sorting (assuming no extra costs). To our knowledge, our study is
the first to look jointly at social pressures, moral motives and the costs of recycling actions
from a stated preference, random utility perspective. This, as we argue below, seems a useful
way of modelling people’s choices over recycling.
Although we find that the preference to sort is motivated by a range of factors, we identify
three broad, latent factors. These can be thought of as measures of three underlying psy-
chological motives which determine both choices and responses to attitudinal statements.
Broadly speaking, they capture, respectively, social pressures, moral norms, and personal
inconvenience aspects. Intuitively, social pressures and moral norms may be hard to dis-
tinguish, and in fact, results on the relative influence of these two factors depend on the
econometric model used (a hybrid multi-nomial logit or hybrid mixed logit model). Never-
theless, our main finding is that the willingness to pay to sort at home is associated with the
latent variable representing moral or intrinsic norms, which is in turn associated with a belief
that home sorting is in fact more thorough than central sorting.
1 The results are based on the distribution of random taste parameters derived from a mixed logit model
estimated on discrete choice experiment data.
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In what follows, the existing empirical literature on the determinants of variations in
recycling behaviour is briefly summarized, before a conceptual model is proposed. The next
section explains the design of the empirical study, and the econometric approach taken.
Results of the hybrid multinomial logit and hybrid mixed logit model are then presented,
before we conclude.
2 What Does the Empirical Literature Tell Us About Decisions to Recycle?
Most of the empirical literature on recycling at the household level2 within environmental
economics has focused on the direct cost to households of engaging in recycling effort—
such as the availability of curbside pick-up recycling rather than “bring” systems where
consumers must transport recyclables to central collection points—and on the opportunity
cost of not recycling, as reflected by the price paid for waste collection (Hong et al. 1993).
This latter factor has received increasing attention as more municipalities and countries have
introduced variable fees for solid waste collection over time (Reichenbach 2008). Recent US
evidence shows a substantial effect on recycling effort from increasing the marginal cost of
household rubbish disposal through a (higher) variable collection fee on the volume of waste
that households generate (Huang et al. 2011).
Another influence on recycling behaviour is the “inconvenience factor”, which can be
thought of as a measure of the time, space and effort needed to be allocated by a household
to achieve a given level of recycling activity. Jenkins et al. (2003) study 1049 households in
20 US metropolitan areas, looking at the influence of the availability of a curbside collection
scheme for recyclables as one measure of this inconvenience factor. They find that for all
materials (glass, newspaper, plastic bottles, aluminium, yard waste and newspapers), presence
of curbside recycling schemes increases recycling effort, but that in no case is the unit price of
waste collection a significant determinant of recycling effort. Kipperberg (2007) confirms the
findings of Jenkins et al. using Norwegian data, estimating separate ordered logit models for
five different categories of waste. Abbott et al. (2013) investigate the log of recycling volume
per capita using data from English local authorities. They find that it is well explained by the
quality of recycling infrastructure provided, and a “social norm”, which they construct as a
mean level of recycling in a reference group of local authorities. Kuo and Perrings (2010)
show for 18 cities in Taiwan and Japan that actual recycling rates depend on the frequency
of collection of both recyclables and rubbish intended for landfilling. Kipperberg and Larson
(2012) show that some of the variation in stated preferences for waste management across
households can be explained with the design characteristics of the recycling system employed
in an area, and its financial cost to households. Refsgaard and Magnussen (2009) also found
institutional features of waste management schemes at the municipality to be important
factors for household behaviour and attitudes.
Another feature that has been shown to matter is income. Huhtala (2010) reports results
from a contingent valuation study in Finland, which collected 1,131 responses to a ques-
tionnaire on WTP for alternative future waste management options for Helsinki. She found
WTP for recycling to be decreasing in household income, which she attributes to the higher
opportunity costs of time for high-income households. Basili et al. (2006) also found income
to be an important determinant of WTP for waste management alternatives.
2 Note that there is also an emerging literature which models recycling behaviour at the level of municipalities
(organisations of local government responsible for household waste collection), looking for example at their
willingness to set up curbside collection schemes (De Jaeger and Eyckmans 2008). Another literature looks
at variations in recycling rates across countries (Mazzanti and Zoboli 2008).
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Another strand of literature has investigated the extent to which indicators of social capital
and community norms influence recycling behaviour. Kurz et al. (2007) show that a proxy
for “sense of community” is closely related to engagement with recycling in Northern Ire-
land. Videras et al. (2012) find that, for a sample of over 2000 US households, intensity
and strength of social ties, and pro-environment community norms, are linked to recycling
behaviour: “…individuals who have strong connections with neighbours and who think most
neighbours do things to help the environment are more likely to recycle” (p. 42). Knussen
et al. (2004), in a study of stated intentions to participate in “bring” recycling schemes in
Glasgow, Scotland, found that 29 % of the variation in intentions was explained by measures
of attitudes, opportunities and what they refer to as subjective norms, in this case the degree
to which respondents felt that their families and friends thought that recycling was a good
thing.
A desire to conform to one’s own ethical standards or a perceived sense of personal
duty may also be important. Hage et al. (2009) study 2800 households in Sweden, and
relate self-reported recycling activity (participation in a packaging waste recovery scheme)
to measures of feelings of personal responsibility. They find that self-reported recycling rates
are increasing in the degree of agreement with a statement “I recognize a moral obligation to
recycle”, and that recycling rates also rise the higher one perceives the degree of recycling
by one’s neighbours to be. Bruvoll et al. (2002), in a survey of 1162 Norwegian citizens,
find that the most frequently cited motivation for home sorting of recyclables was “I should
do what I want others to do”, with “I want to think of myself as a responsible person” as
the second most highly reported reason. Respondents to this study were also faced with the
following question: “Assume that a recycling company can make use of your waste. New
technology makes it possible to sort waste centrally so that the environmental effect will be
the same. The company collects the unsorted waste from your home. Would you make use of
the offer if this did not increase your expenses, or would you prefer to sort yourself?” 72 %
of the respondents of Bruvoll et al. (2002) reported that they would make use of the offer,
hence preferring separation of recyclables by others rather than by themselves.
In a paper very relevant to our own work, Brekke et al. (2010) consider the role of what
they refer to as duty orientation (see also Brekke et al. 2003; Nyborg 2011). Duty-oriented
individuals prefer to keep an image of themselves as socially responsible people. They may
thus be willing to recycle even at a personal cost—provided that recycling is perceived as
their personal responsibility. If in doubt whether they are in fact personally responsible for
recycling, they may look to the behaviour of their peers; if so, their recycling actions can
be increasing in the degree to which they believe others are also recycling (Nyborg et al.
2006). Brekke et al. (2010) test this hypothesis using data from a survey of glass recycling
by Norwegian households. The survey includes information on whether individuals perceive
recycling to be a moral responsibility, how common they thought recycling to be amongst their
friends and family, how sure they were about this, and a dummy variable for self-reported glass
recycling behaviour. The authors find that the feeling of personal responsibility is increasing
in how common people thought recycling to be amongst friends and family; further, the
more certain respondents were of this frequency estimate, the higher the feeling of personal
responsibility. As perceived responsibility increases, glass recycling becomes more likely.
Moreover, while the study indicated a direct effect of social sanctions (the fear of negative
reactions from others) on recycling behaviour, the main effect of social sanctions appeared to
arise indirectly, through their effect on feelings of personal responsibility. The Brekke et al.
(2010) study did not, however, explore whether respondents preferred to sort themselves or
to leave the sorting to others, the topic we will be turning to below.
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3 Conceptual Framework
Before turning to the empirical study, let us take a moment to consider how factors like social
pressure, moral motivation and effort could be expected to affect pro-environment behaviours
such as recycling.
To fix ideas, consider an individual who cares about her private consumption c, a public
good G, which we may think of as environmental quality, her own self-image as a morally
responsible person S, and what she expects others’ image of her to be, J :
U = u (c, G) + S + J, (1)
where u is a quasi-concave and increasing function. Let g ≥ 0 be the person’s contribution
to the public good (environmental quality). The budget constraint is given by
W = c + pg, (2)
where W is the individual’s exogenous income, and the price of consumption is normalized
to one. p is an implicit price of contributions to the environment in terms of lost consumption;
if recycling is cumbersome, this corresponds to a higher p, and if sorting is fun or otherwise
intrinsically rewarding, this reduces p.
The above can be interpreted as assuming that income, consumption and recycling con-
tributions are material only. A more general interpretation, allowing us to include recycling
contributions in terms of time and/or inconvenience as well as money within this very simple
framework, is that W measures generalized or full income, incorporating the individual’s
total available resources including time (Becker 1965). Similarly, c can represent general-
ized consumption (a monetary aggregate of private goods consumption and leisure). We can
then interpret g as the individual’s total environmental contribution, which may be produced
through the use of time and/or money.3
Total supply of the public good depends on the contribution of every individual in society.
However, assume that the society is large, and that the single individual’s contribution is
too small, relative to the total level of G, to make it possible for her to noticeably perceive
the change in G due to her own contribution. She will thus, when making her choices, treat
environmental quality G as if it were exogenously fixed.
Nevertheless, she may contribute to the environment due to image concerns (self-image
and others’ image of her). Assume that self-image is given by
S = −a (g − g∗)2 , (3)
where a is a weakly positive constant, and g∗ ≥ 0 is i’s view of the morally ideal contri-
bution (see Brekke et al. 2003, 2010; Nyborg 2011). Any deviation from the morally ideal
behaviour yields a psychological loss, which may be thought of as cognitive dissonance.
The morally ideal contribution g∗ may be viewed as a measure of the individual’s perceived
moral responsibility for recycling. Note that if g∗ < W , the individual finds it morally infe-
rior to increase her contributions beyond a certain level, and doing so would then reduce
her self-image. For example, she may find it unethical not to spend at least some resources
3 More precisely, let all income be wage income. Let w be an exogenous wage rate, C be material consumption,
L working time, l leisure, and T the exogenous total time available. Let recycling time be t and material
recycling contributions m. The time constraint is then T = L + l + t , and the material budget constraint is
wL = C + m. Combining these two, we get wT = C + wl + m + wt . Define W = wT as full income,
c = C +wl as generalized consumption, and g = (m + wt)/p as contributions in environmental units (where
p measures how much input is needed to produce one unit of environmental improvement). Inserting for these
definitions in the previous expression, we are back to the generalized budget equation (2).
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to take good care of herself and her family; or, for home recycling efforts in particular, she
may believe that central sorting would be equally or more socially beneficial and hence any
contribution beyond that would be inefficient use of their time.
In addition to self-image, the individual may also care about others’ image of her. Assume
that believed judgement from others is given by
J = −b (g − g∗∗)2 (4)
where b is a weakly positive constant, and g∗∗ ≥ 0 is the individual’s belief about her
peers’ view of the ideal contribution for a person like herself. If no peers can observe her
contribution, b = 0. Again, it is not necessarily the case that the ideal is as large as possible;
if the individual thinks, for example, that her neighbours consider recycling foolish, she may
be embarrassed, if observed recycling.
In the present paper, the ideal contributions g∗ and g∗∗ are taken to be exogenously
given. However, note that in several previous papers, the morally ideal contribution has been
assumed to be increasing in the social value of contributions (Brekke et al. 2003, 2010;
Nyborg 2011).
When deciding how much to contribute, the individual maximizes Eq. (1) with respect to g,
given (2)–(4). This yields the following first order condition for an interior utility maximum:
g = ag
∗ + bg∗∗ − 2pu′c
a + b (5)
where u′c = ∂u (c, G)/∂c is the marginal utility of consumption.4 That is, whether and
how much the individual will recycle depends on the extent to which she feels obliged to
do so (g∗ and g∗∗), the strength of her preference to conform to these duties (a and b),
and the loss of generalized consumption benefits (pu′c, including monetary cost as well as
costs in terms of time or inconvenience) caused by the marginal recycling contribution. If
the moral and social motivations to recycle are always too weak compared to the private
marginal cost of contributing
(
pu′c
)
, the individual prefers not to recycle at all. That is, if
ag∗ + bg∗∗ < 2p∂u (W, G)/∂c, the utility maximum is a corner solution, since g cannot
take negative values and the first order condition (5) cannot hold.
The above framework does not specify whether the individual judges others (exerts social
pressure on them). It is reasonable to assume, however, that within a peer group there is a
close relationship between g∗ and g∗∗: if the individual’s peers are like her and share her
moral ideal g∗, and if her beliefs are correct, then g∗ = g∗∗. In that case, one cannot separate
parameters a and b empirically based on observed behaviour [see Eq. (5)]. Thus, although
internalized moral norms and social pressure may be conceptually different motives, they
may be hard to distinguish in practice.
If the individual believes that her peers’ view of the morally ideal recycling level is different
from her own, however, she will have to trade off her desire for a good self-image against
the desire to be judged favourably. If g∗ increases marginally, all else fixed, the optimal
contribution increases by a/(a + b).5 Similarly, if g∗∗ increases marginally, all else fixed,
the optimal contribution increases by b/(a + b).
Consequently, if recycling is costly and/or burdensome, and you do not find intrinsic
pleasure in it, a model like the one sketched above implies that you will recycle only if your
preferences for image concerns are sufficiently strong, and, in addition, that your perception
4 Recall that G is considered exogenous, implying ∂G/∂g = 0 (from the individual’s point of view).
5 This can be seen by differentiation of eq.(5).
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of the responsibility imposed on you by yourself and others is sufficiently strong.6 All else
equal, the model predicts that an individuals’ contribution will be increasing in her view of
the morally ideal contribution, and how much she cares about this; it will also be increasing
in her belief about others’ view of the ideal contribution, and how much she cares about their
views; and it will be decreasing in her private marginal cost of contributing.
Although suppressed in the notation above, the exogenously fixed parameters and variables
a, b, g∗ and g∗∗ may vary between individuals. Below, we estimate the effects of perceived
moral responsibility and peer pressure on recycling choices. We do so via indices which
represent individual’s rating of the extent to which neighbours judge them with respect to
their recycling behaviour and the importance to them of a positive self-image from recycling.
With regard to the marginal cost
(
pu′c
)
we estimate the effects of changes in the financial
cost to the household of waste collection contracts (which reduces freely disposable income)
and the net effort or pleasure in recycling. Note that although the above model may be
helpful in thinking about the relationship between moral responsibility, peer pressure and
recycling behaviour, our estimated coefficients for moral responsibility and peer pressure do
not correspond exactly to the parameters a and b, since g∗ and g∗∗ above were measured in
environmental units, while our questionnaire responses indicate the level of agreement with
verbal statements.
4 Design of the Empirical Study
4.1 Methodology: The Discrete Choice Experiment Approach
In this paper, we use a choice experiment approach to estimate the preferences of individuals
for household recycling. Discrete choice experiments (DCE) have been widely applied in the
environmental, health, food and transport economics literatures (Hanley et al. 2013; Carson
and Czajkowski 2014). DCE are a stated preference method, where respondents make choices
over goods or policy options described in terms of the attributes of these goods or policies,
and the levels that they take. A price or cost attribute is usually included in the design to
allow willingness to pay for changes in any non-price attribute to be calculated. As noted
above, stated preference approaches to investigating the demand for recycling and waste
management are numerous (Basili et al. 2006).
DCE are based on random utility theory, which states that the utility function can be
disaggregated into deterministic and stochastic (random) components. Assumptions about
the nature of this random component and the nature of preferences in terms of how they vary
across respondents lead to a variety of econometric specifications. The main advantage of
using the DCE approach here is that preferences and willingness to pay for different attributes
of recycling schemes can be directly estimated, along with the impact of a number of potential
determinants of recycling choice behaviour, such as selfish interest, social pressures and sense
of moral duty.
4.2 Questionnaire Design
Polish law has required the sorting of municipal waste since the beginning of 2010. However,
it is not specified in law exactly how this sorting should take place—whether household waste
6 For related models, see Brekke et al. (2003), Bruvoll and Nyborg (2004), Nyborg et al. (2006) and Nyborg
(2011).
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should be collected in an already-sorted state (that is, sorted by the household), or collected
un-sorted and then sorted centrally. The hypothetical scenario of our study coincided with
government’s plans to make each municipality (instead of private companies) responsible for
waste management, by setting ‘waste fees’ for all households and hiring private companies to
collect municipal waste from them.7 The sorting method can be selected by each municipality
independently, and collected at a range of frequencies.8
We used the following attributes to describe a set of hypothetical future alternative con-
tracts for waste which were considered by respondents:
– The number of categories waste needs to be sorted into before it will be collected (1, 2,
or 5 categories);
– The number of times each month that waste is collected from your property (1, 2, 4 times
per month): frequency of collection has been shown to be important in other, comparable
studies (Karousakis and Birol 2008);
– A cost to the household per month (25, 50, 75, 100 PLN—the bill they will face for waste
collection).
An example choice card (translated) is presented in Fig. 1. The number of home sorting
categories ranged from 1 (no sorting required), through 2 (recyclables, non-recyclables) to 5
(paper, glass, metals, plastic, other). The respondents were informed, however, that in every
case the collected waste would undergo a central screening process, and due to regulatory
requirements, even if it was collected unsorted it would still be sorted in a central professional
sorting facility. Thus, irrespective of people’s choices at the household level, a fixed quantity
of recycling would be attained at the municipal level. However, no assurance was given about
the quality of this central recycling effort: many of our respondents could thus believe that
the care taken in and thus the effectiveness of recycling actions would be higher if recycling
were done by households prior to collection. The survey also reminded people that sorting
into more categories required more space in the household and more time and effort, and
that a lower frequency of collecting waste requires that waste is stored on the respondent’s
property for longer. All levels of the attributes used in our study (including cost) were derived
from observing the range of current practices of waste-collecting companies in 2013.
The study conducted here was a follow-up to Czajkowski et al. (2014) and so it used
almost the same questionnaire and design,9 supplemented with additional attitudinal ques-
tions aimed at uncovering the motives of respondents in making their recycling choices (see
7 There is now substantial evidence that many of the biases identified in the stated preference studies are
a result of the lack of incentive compatibility of the survey (Carson and Groves 2007; Carson et al. 2014),
and in particular—the lack of perceived consequentiality of the survey, the importance of which has been
demonstrated by both theoretical and empirical work (Nepal et al. 2009; Vossler and Evans 2009; Herriges
et al. 2010; Broadbent 2012; Vossler et al. 2012; Vossler and Watson 2013). Our study aimed at being perceived
as consequential. To this end, respondents were informed about the upcoming waste collection policy changes
in the country and the necessity to decide upon a uniform waste collection scheme for entire municipality. The
questions in the DCE part of the survey were thus framed from this perspective—collecting the respondents’
preferences, which can influence future policy options. We acknowledge, however, that this leads to a potential
difference between the theoretical model and our empirical application—note that the theoretical model focuses
on individual’s motivations while the empirical study scenario dealt with a new policy common for all: this
could lead to some other strategy being optimal.
8 The rationale for this change was to reduce the illegal trash dumping as well as impose more stringent
recycling targets, in order to comply with EU Landfill Directive (1999/31; provide reductions in landfilling)
and the EU Waste Framework Directive (2008/98; reaching minimum target levels of recycling).
9 The experimental design of the original study, used also here, consisted of 6 choice-tasks each with 3
alternatives per respondent; there were 4 questionnaire versions (blocks). The design was optimized for
median D-efficiency of a multinomial logit model using Bayesian priors (Ferrini and Scarpa 2007) and all
prior estimates were assumed to be normally distributed, with their means derived from the MNL model
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Choice Situation 1. Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 
Method of sorting in 
household 
Into 5 categories Into 2 categories None 
Frequency of collection Once every 4 weeks Once every 2 weeks Once every week 
Monthly cost for your 
household 
75 PLN 50 PLN 100 PLN 
Your choice: 
Fig. 1 Example of a choice card
Fig. 1 for details). Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or
disagreed (“I definitely disagree”, “I somewhat disagree”, “I neither agree nor disagree”, “I
somewhat agree”, “I definitely agree”) with the following statements which correspond to
our explanatory variables:
• better—“Sorting waste at home would be more thorough than at a central sorting facility”;
• troublesome—“Sorting waste at home is troublesome”;
• satisfying—“Sorting waste myself would give me a satisfaction”;
• careful—“If I sort waste, I would do it carefully”;
• know—“I know how to sort waste”;
• moral-duty—“Sorting waste at home is my moral/ethical duty”;
• neighbours-judge—“My neighbours will judge me unfavourably, if I don’t sort waste at
home”;10
• i-judge—“I judge neighbours who don’t sort waste at home unfavourably”;
• everyone-should—“Sorting waste is something everyone should do on his own”;
• cost-saving—“Sorting waste will allow to reduce my bills”.
In addition, in what follows we use the respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics to
provide an insight into what observed variables can be related to their attitudes and motives.
These variables include respondents’ gender, age, household size and income, their responses
to the questions about the extent to which they are satisfied with living in their town (satisfied
city) and consider it clean (clean city) as well as their declarations about whether they ever
participated in cleaning events (such as the Earth Day cleanup activities), if they currently
sort their waste, and whether they have a home composting facility.
A mail survey of 8000 randomly-chosen households was undertaken in March 2013. The
survey was targeted at the population of the two Polish towns of Józefów and Hrubieszów.
These towns were selected because most inhabitants live in stand-alone houses, rather than
in apartment buildings (since residents of apartment blocks typically do not have a direct
influence on what recycling scheme is implemented for the entire building and because they
Footnote 9 continued
estimated on the dataset from the pilot survey, and standard deviations equal to 0.25 of each parameter mean
(to reflect the relatively large uncertainty about the true parameters). We intentionally did not update the design
using the information from the main wave of the study reported in Czajkowski et al. (2014) because we wanted
to keep the design and the questionnaire as similar to the original as possible, to make the results comparable
and only focus on exploring the attitudinal explanations to the observed results.
10 Note that many of our actions as household recyclers might be observable. There are several aspects of
recycling behaviour which your neighbours can observe. For example, how many different bins one puts out
for collection—which is equivalent to how many fractions you sort your waste into—can be observed. Your
neighbours can also see how frequently you put out your bins, and which company you have contracted with.
They could possibly also observe trips you make to the local drop-off recycling centre.
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are likely less concerned about collection frequency—the waste is stored in a common,
designated space rather than on one’s property). At the time of the study there were many
different waste collection companies which differed with respect to how frequently they
collected waste and to what degree they required household waste to be sorted. It was at each
household’s discretion whether to sign an agreement with one of the companies to collect their
waste. The design of our survey was thus highly realistic, and reflected the actual decision
problem which householders were faced with.
We received 418 usable questionnaires out of the 8000 questionnaires sent out, that is,
a response rate of only 5.23 %. Even for a one-shot mail-out study, this is very low, and
there may be good reason to expect that respondents with particularly strong opinions about
waste policies are over-represented. Consequently, our analysis should not be interpreted as
measuring the average citizen’s views and values. Primarily, it is an attempt to understand
what motivates those who, like in Czajkowski et al. (2014), prefer to sort themselves even
at a cost. In addition, we believe that the data offers an interesting possibility to explore the
relationships between attitudes, socio-demographic characteristics and choices, even though
one should keep in mind that these relationships may possibly be influenced by self-selection
into the sample.11 We return to possible sample selection issues in the discussion section.
4.3 Econometric Approach
In order to analyse the links between respondents’ attitudes, their socio-demographic char-
acteristics and discrete choices, we apply the Hybrid Multinomial Logit (HMNL) model
and the Hybrid Mixed Logit (HMXL) model. These combine the framework widely adopted
for analysing DCE data, the multinomial logit or the mixed Logit (Revelt and Train 1998),
with the Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model (Jöreskog and Goldberger
1975).12 We use these models to investigate the relative effects of economic, moral and social
factors on preference heterogeneity.
Given that our attitudinal questions such as how much people think their neighbours
will judge their actions are merely indications of the underlying factors which guide peo-
ple’s choices and attitudes towards recycling, we treat these psychological factors as latent
variables, which provide a link between respondents’ attitudinal responses and their stated
preferences expressed in the DCE. The usual practice is to instead include stated attitudes
as explanatory variables in the choice model directly,13 or identify individual-specific fac-
tors explaining respondents’ attitudes14 and use these factors to explain their choices—but
11 The respondents from Józefów were, on average, similar to those from Hrubieszów with respect to sex,
age, household size and the number of children in a household. They were, however, (reportedly) wealthier
and more often university educated. The data regarding socio-demographic characteristics of the population of
the two towns targeted by our survey is not fully available. Using the available data (in some cases from larger
administrative regions) we find that our sample had a larger share of females, respondents who were older,
better educated, lived in larger households and were wealthier (particularly in Józefów). We do not therefore
claim that the sample is representative for the populations of either of the two towns.
12 Hybrid choice models are sometimes called Integrated Choice and Latent Variable (ICLV) models (Ben-
Akiva et al. 2002). For example, Daziano and Bolduc (2013) include environmental concern as a behavioural
variable in the context of a simple multinomial logit model to explain automobile choices. Hess and Beharry-
Borg (2012) include pro-environmental attitude as a latent variable in a Latent Class model to explain
preferences over rail travel.
13 Note that it is likely that the indicators may then be endogenous, i.e. the errors in the measurement equations
of respondents’ attitudes could be correlated with errors in the discrete choice models (Louviere et al. 2005;
Bahamonde-Birke and Ortúzar 2012) leading to inconsistent parameter estimators.
14 In many cases there are many indicators describing one psychological factor, which may lead to a large
number of estimable parameters in the model, collinearity and difficulty with the interpretation of results.
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in a 2-step fashion. However, as noted in the next paragraph, there are problems with this
approach. In contrast, our approach simultaneously identifies the links between psychological
factors as well as attitudinal statements, and accounts for the relationships that are relevant
for explaining choices (in the choice model). In addition, we introduce a socio-demographic
component which takes respondents’ observed characteristics into account by using them to
explain variation in these latent psychological traits. In combination, this provides a better
understanding of the variability in preferences for recycling across households in terms of the
effects on these preferences of social norms, moral values and socio-economic characteristics
such as household income.
From the econometric robustness point of view, our approach potentially deals with
an endogeneity problem associated with a common set of un-observables co-determining
both answers to attitudinal questions and choices, and with the potential co-linearity prob-
lem which arises if all attitudinal indicators (some possibly strongly correlated with each
other) enter the discrete choice model simultaneously and independently (Daly et al. 2012).
Instead, our approach identifies the main psychological factors (or traits) as latent vari-
ables which drive responses to attitudinal questions; and uses these latent variables to
explain respondents’ recycling choices, while at the same time allowing for links between
the latent variables and respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics. It is important to
point out that the parameters in all components of our hybrid models (the measurement,
structural, discrete choice components) are estimated simultaneously, thus improving statis-
tical efficiency. The technical details of model structure and estimation are provided in the
“Appendix”.15
5 Results
Results from the attitudinal questions are shown in Fig. 2. In terms of attitudinal statements,
64 % of respondents agree that home sorting is more thorough than sorting at a central facility,
slightly less than half agreed that “sorting waste at home is troublesome”, whilst just over 50 %
agreed that “sorting waste myself would give me a satisfaction”. Over 80 % of the sample say
that they know how to sort waste and that they would be doing it carefully. About 75 % agreed
that sorting waste at home was their moral or ethical duty, with a similar fraction agreeing that
“sorting waste is something everyone should do” (this is possibly a reflection of self-selection
in our sample). Around 1/4 of people agreed with the statement “my neighbours will judge
me unfavourably, if I don’t sort waste at home”, but just over 50 % agreed that they would also
judge other people who do not sort at home.16 Finally, about 2/3rds of respondents agreed that
“sorting waste will allow me to reduce my future bills”, which likely reflects their expectations
about the effects of current actions on the future costs of waste collection and sorting. This
data is used below to explain preference heterogeneity within the HMNL and the HMXL
models.
As a point of departure, however, we start by estimating a simple multinomial logit (MNL)
model to explain stated choices of waste management contract (Table 1). This shows that, on
average, our respondents prefer to sort into more categories rather than fewer: sorting into 2
or 5 categories rather than no sorting both positively influence the probability of choosing a
15 The software codes developed in Matlab used in this study are available at http://czaj.org and provided
under CC BY 4.0 license.
16 The different responses to these two questions do not necessarily mean that respondents are more judging
than they expect their neighbours to be. Being judged by one’s neighbours requires observability, which is
implicit in the second question, but hardly in the first.
123
658 M. Czajkowski et al.
9%
7%
16%
16%
7%
5%
4%
13%
20%
7%
7%
4%
12%
14%
7%
2%
3%
11%
28%
10%
19%
13%
17%
42%
12%
11%
11%
21%
9%
26%
23%
34%
27%
16%
32%
33%
31%
30%
28%
30%
41%
42%
28%
12%
42%
49%
50%
25%
16%
27%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Sorng waste will allow to reduce my bills (cost-saving)
Sorng waste is something everyone should do on his own (everyone-should)
I judge neighbours who don’t sort waste at home unfavourably (i-judge)
My neighbours will judge me unfavourably, if I don’t sort waste at home (neighbors-judge)
Sorng waste at home is my moral/ethical duty (moral-duty)
I know how to sort waste (know)
If I sort waste, I would do it carefully (careful)
Sorng waste myself would give me a sasfacon (sasfying)
Sorng waste at home is troublesome (troublesome)
Sorng waste at home would be more thorough than at a central sorng facility (beer)
I deﬁnitely disagree I somewhat disagree I neither agree nor disagree I somewhat agree I deﬁnitely agree
Fig. 2 Respondents’ attitudes with respect to in-home sorting
Table 1 General preferences
with respect to waste
management contract
characteristics—the results of the
multinomial logit model
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significance at 1, 5,
10 % level
Variable Coefficient
(standard error)
WTP [PLN]
(95 % CI)
sort2 0.6144*** 15.66***
(0.0978) (11.18–20.14)
sort5 0.7314*** 18.64***
(0.0708) (15.32–21.95)
time2 0.4630*** 11.80***
(0.1020) (6.41–17.19)
time4 0.2601*** 6.63***
(0.0758) (2.90–10.36)
cost −0.0392*** –
(0.0015)
Model characteristics
Log likelihood −1398.35
Log-likelihood (constants only) −2026.50
McFadden’s pseudo R2 0.3100
AIC/n 1.5171
n (observations) 1850
k (parameters) 5
particular alternative (ceteris paribus). This result of a positive preference for (costly) home
sorting mirrors that reported for a different data set in Czajkowski et al. (2014), and thus
provides a good basis for exploring the paradox identified in that paper and discussed at the
outset of this paper: that people prefer to sort themselves, even if it is costly and does not
affect the overall level of recycling. On average, respondents prefer waste to be collected
either twice or four times per month rather than only once per month, and prefer cheaper
waste contracts to more expensive ones.
The results of the hybrid multinomial logit (HMNL) model are presented in Table 2, which
is divided into three panels labelled “measurement equations”, “structural equations” and
“discrete choice model”. The first panel includes the estimation results of the measurement
component of the model. The Likert-scale responses to 10 attitudinal statements correspond-
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ing to different motives for recycling were modelled using ordered a probit framework (see
the “Appendix” for details). The first three columns present the estimated parameters corre-
sponding to the latent variables—those underlying un-observed psychological factors which
explain respondents’ attitudes and choices. We found that the model with three factors outper-
formed specifications with fewer factors, while providing consistent and reasonable results
in all three components. We allowed all latent variables to explain all measurement equations
(i.e., we did not impose any a priori structure).17 This measurement component of the model
(the first part of Table 1) provides an understanding of the main factors (latent variables or LV)
which underlie respondents’ attitudes, and hence their responses to the questions illustrated
in Fig. 2.
The first LV reflects social pressures as well as moral considerations and cost: LV1 is
associated with being more likely (than the rest of the sample) to report that sorting is
satisfying, saying that one would do it carefully, that one has a moral duty to do it, that
sorting is something everyone should do themselves, that neighbours would judge one if one
does not sort, and that one would judge one’s own neighbours if they do not sort; also, that
sorting will allow one to reduce bills (cost-saving). This last variable should be interpreted
with care, however: the monetary cost of the waste handling contract is already accounted for
in the discrete choice model (to be described below), so cost-saving should rather be taken to
capture households’ general beliefs about whether more home sorting will eventually lead to
reduced waste bills. Interpreted this way, cost-saving may partly reflect respondents’ beliefs
about the social efficiency of home sorting.
LV2 seems surprisingly similar to LV1. Both are significantly and positively associated
with finding sorting satisfying, being careful, finding sorting a moral duty, judging neighbours
who do not sort, and believing that everybody should sort at home. In fact, for every single
variable in the measurement equations, the coefficients for LV1 and LV2 have the same sign;
they differ in terms of coefficients’ size and statistical significance only. In particular, unlike
LV1, LV2 is significantly associated with saying that home-sorting is better than central
sorting, is not troublesome, and that one knows how to do it well; unlike LV1, the association
is insignificant with regard to expecting judgement from one’s neighbours or expecting cost-
savings. The parameter on “I judge my neighbours badly if they do not recycle” is also much
higher for LV1 than for LV2.
LV3 seems quite different from both LV1 and LV2. LV3 is associated with not believing
home sorting is better than sorting in a central facility, with finding sorting troublesome and
not satisfying, not knowing how to do it well, not being careful when sorting, not regarding
it a moral duty, and neither judging one’s neighbours badly nor expecting judgement from
them.
One summary of this may be that LV1 and LV2 both capture norm-based motivation to sort.
LV1 seems more strongly linked to extrinsic motives (social pressure, cost), while LV2 cap-
tures, to a greater extent, internalized motivation (moral duty, the belief that home sorting is in
fact better than central sorting). LV3, on the other hand, appears to reflect the view that sorting
at home is not a morally superior choice at all: it is not better, it is troublesome, and that it is not
something everyone should do. Note, in particular, that only LV2 is associated with the belief
that home sorting is better (more thorough) than sorting in a central facility. LV1 reflects a
generally positive attitude towards sorting, without being significantly associated with a belief
17 The last four columns present the estimates of the threshold parameters which are used to categorize
a continuous (unobserved) index response into the 5 observed levels of disagreement / agreement. These
thresholds parameters do not have a direct interpretation—overall their significance shows that the model
performs well in predicting respondents’ attitudinal Likert scale responses.
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that home sorting is better. LV3 is significantly associated with a belief that home sorting is not
better.
The next section of Table 2 presents the structural component of the model in which
the latent variables are linked with respondents’ observed socio-demographic characteris-
tics. This makes it possible not only to identify latent traits which govern responses to
the attitudinal questions, but also provides an insight into how likely these traits are for
respondents with different socio-demographic characteristics. This shows that those with
attitudes represented by LV1 are likely to belong to a smaller household, have higher
income, have participated in cleaning the city (such as the Earth Day cleanup activities),
currently sort their waste, and are less likely to have a home composting facility. Those with
attitudes represented by LV2 are mostly female, come from a larger household, and have
higher income. Finally, those with attitudes represented by LV3 are from the highest income
group, do not currently sort, and do not have compost facilities. Respondents with strong
LV2 and LV3 traits are more likely to state that they are less satisfied with living in their
cities.
The third panel of Table 2 reports on the discrete choice component of the model. In this
component, respondents’ discrete choices across recycling contract alternatives are explained
using the attribute levels which characterized these alternatives, along with the individual-
specific latent variables. This provides an insight into how the preferences of respondents
with a particular trait (latent variable) differ from the preferences of other respondents.
These latent variables are specified as interactions with the attribute level parameters. Since
the LVs are normalized with a mean 0 and standard deviation 1, the first column (reporting
main effects) is very similar to the results provided by a stand-alone simple MNL model
(Table 1).
Turning to the interactions, the following interesting pattern appears: the preference to
sort into more categories—i.e., a positive and significant coefficient for sort2 and sort5—is
associated only with latent variable 2. For LV1 there is no significant relationship, while
for LV3, there is a significant negative coefficient for sorting into five categories. In other
words: wanting to sort appears to be associated with an internalized norm-based motivation,
involving the belief that sorting at source is indeed better (more thorough) than sorting in a
central facility.18
Next, we present results from the hybrid mixed logit (HMXL) model, which adds a
representation of respondents’ un-observed preference heterogeneity (Table 3).19 This model
offers a better fit than the equivalent MNL version in Table 2, as indicated by the lower score
of the normalized Akaike Information Criterion, and formally supported by the results of the
LR-test (test statistic 127.12, 5 d.f., p value < 0.0001).
Using this model, we see a pattern roughly similar to the above, although with some dif-
ferences for individual questions. Again, only LV2 is associated with the belief that home
sorting is better, while LV3 is associated with the belief that it is not better. In the mea-
surement equations, LV1 is significantly associated with three questions only, all of them
closely related to social approval: judging one’s neighbours, expecting to be judged by them,
and thinking that everyone should sort at home. LV2 is positively associated with neither
of these; instead, LV2 is linked to several questions indicative of an intrinsically positive
18 Further, LV2 is associated with a higher willingness to pay (cost). There are significant interaction effects
for LV1 with time2 and time4, and a negative interaction with cost; that is, people with attitudes associated with
LV1 generally want waste collected more often and are more cost-sensitive. LV3 is associated with wanting
more frequent collection and lower price sensitivity.
19 This heterogeneity shows up in the standard deviations of the random coefficients associated with the
choice attributes—we see that there are significant standard deviation terms for sort5, time4 and costs.
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Table 2 The results of the hybrid multinomial logit model (standard errors given in parentheses)
Measurement equations
Latent
variable 1
Latent
variable 2
Latent
variable 3
Threshold 1 Threshold 2 Threshold 3 Threshold 4
better 0.1421 0.3377*** −0.4747*** −1.6621*** −1.1141*** −0.2823 0.7479***
(0.0863) (0.0913) (0.0795) (0.1061) (0.2385) (0.2666) (0.2824)
troublesome −0.0865 −0.3943*** 0.4166*** −1.0022*** −0.1634 0.2727 1.1744***
(0.0887) (0.0866) (0.0799) (0.0803) (0.1376) (0.1493) (0.1698)
satisfying 0.3845*** 0.7483*** −0.8450*** −1.7024*** −1.1389*** −0.3358 1.0362***
(0.1263) (0.1320) (0.1120) (0.1201) (0.2590) (0.2939) (0.3312)
careful 0.5544*** 0.6538*** −1.0174*** −2.7484*** −2.3434*** −1.4548** 0.1090
(0.1363) (0.1558) (0.1283) (0.1931) (0.6016) (0.6653) (0.7098)
know 0.1963 0.4890*** −0.7939*** −2.2548*** −1.9738*** −1.2441*** 0.1275
(0.1067) (0.1234) (0.1078) (0.1556) (0.4045) (0.4616) (0.4967)
moral-duty 0.7323*** 1.0450*** −1.5655*** −3.0341*** −2.1710** −1.3656 0.5266
(0.1852) (0.2283) (0.1914) (0.2474) (0.8616) (0.9091) (0.9944)
neighbours-judge 0.6597*** 0.0381 −0.2806*** −1.2677*** −0.7147*** 0.8024*** 1.4796***
(0.0996) (0.1192) (0.1060) (0.0992) (0.1792) (0.2351) (0.2567)
i-judge 1.0128*** 0.4052** −0.5693*** −1.5929*** −0.9911*** −0.3489 0.9858**
(0.1581) (0.1721) (0.1323) (0.1384) (0.2831) (0.3218) (0.3874)
everyone-should 1.2728*** 0.9478*** −1.5572*** −3.4727*** −2.8098** −1.6101 0.5765
(0.2181) (0.2694) (0.2085) (0.3115) (1.1728) (1.2758) (1.3997)
cost-saving 0.5264*** 0.2180 −0.6293*** −1.6979*** −1.2678*** −0.5220 0.3270
(0.0987) (0.1225) (0.0980) (0.1136) (0.2436) (0.2788) (0.2975)
Structural equations
Latent
variable 1
Latent
variable 2
Latent
variable 3
male −0.0692 −0.2061*** 0.0213
(0.0780) (0.0753) (0.0788)
age 0.0906 0.1342 0.0504
(0.0827) (0.0862) (0.0809)
household size −0.1958** 0.2103** 0.1558
(0.0820) (0.0844) (0.0890)
income 0.2691** 0.3630*** 0.3774***
(0.1071) (0.0995) (0.0883)
satisfied city −0.1441 −0.4252*** −0.4838***
(0.1233) (0.1612) (0.1405)
clean city 0.2026** 0.0892 0.0845
(0.0808) (0.0934) (0.0883)
ever cleaned −0.1055 −0.0397 −0.1427
(0.0753) (0.0840) (0.0760)
currently sort 0.2021** 0.1487 −0.2135**
(0.0816) (0.0858) (0.0837)
compost −0.3476*** −0.1483 −0.3387***
(0.0910) (0.1016) (0.0868)
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Table 2 continued
Discrete choice model
Main effects Interactions
Latent variable 1 Latent variable 2 Latent variable 3
sort2 0.8411*** 0.0285 0.5488*** −0.3127
(0.1482) (0.1777) (0.1835) (0.1654)
sort5 0.8940*** −0.0429 1.1920*** −1.0160***
(0.1242) (0.2380) (0.2119) (0.1996)
time2 0.4007** 0.7296*** −0.1064 0.9879***
(0.1804) (0.2127) (0.2513) (0.2039)
time4 0.1101 0.9196*** 0.1773 1.1531***
(0.1395) (0.2098) (0.2570) (0.1974)
cost −0.0599*** −0.0126** 0.0284*** 0.0138**
(0.0036) (0.0051) (0.0047) (0.0057)
Model characteristics
Log-likelihood −6300.87
Log-likelihood (constants only) −7841.45
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 0.1965
AIC/n 6.9469
n (observations) 1850
k (parameters) 117
attitude to sorting (it is satisfying, not troublesome, one does it carefully and knows how to
do it), and with the expectation not to be judged by others if not sorting. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, LV2 is now not significantly linked tomoral duty. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say
that LV1 largely reflects concerns related to social approval, while LV2 appears to reflect an
internalized positive attitude. LV3 again appears to represent the view that sorting at home
is not socially useful (it is not better, troublesome, and not satisfying) and is thus no oblig-
ation: the negative associations with moral duty and everyone-should are strong and highly
significant.
Looking at the discrete choice part of the HMXL model, a clear pattern emerges with
respect to the three latent variables: wanting to sort (sort2 and sort5) is associated with LV2
only. There is no significant relationship between LV1 and the preference to sort. For LV3,
there is a strong and significant association with not wanting to sort.
In summary, we were able to identify three major factors (distinct latent variables)
which on the one hand allow us to explain the variation in respondents’ attitudinal
responses, and on the other can be associated with significant differences in respon-
dents preferences expressed in the discrete choice experiment. At the same time, these
factors can be linked with respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics. Whilst the
associations between the latent variables on the one hand and attitudinal statements and
preference parameter estimates are not causal, they indicate that the preference to home
sort into more categories is associated with an underlying intrinsic, positive attitude to
sorting at home, involving the belief that home sorting is more thorough than central
sorting.
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Table 3 The results of the hybrid mixed logit model (standard errors given in parentheses)
Measurement equations
Latent
variable 1
Latent
variable 2
Latent
variable 3
Threshold 1 Threshold 2 Threshold 3 Threshold 4
better −0.0767 0.2742** −0.5367*** −1.6859*** −1.1331*** −0.2910 0.7559***
(0.1135) (0.1246) (0.0847) (0.1097) (0.1246) (0.1565) (0.1539)
troublesome −0.0430 −0.2861** 0.4428*** −0.9905*** −0.1554 0.2776** 1.1669***
(0.0952) (0.1392) (0.0821) (0.0797) (0.1135) (0.1208) (0.1580)
satisfying 0.2063 0.5648** −1.0151*** −1.7320*** −1.1626*** −0.3528 1.0461***
(0.1634) (0.2548) (0.1289) (0.1344) (0.2117) (0.2518) (0.3623)
careful 0.1052 0.7632*** −1.3457*** −3.0889*** −2.6165*** −1.6285*** 0.1031
(0.2150) (0.2504) (0.2045) (0.2572) (0.3228) (0.3942) (0.4861)
know −0.1186 0.5356*** −0.8824*** −2.3872*** −2.0886*** −1.3146*** 0.1210
(0.1493) (0.1659) (0.1476) (0.1740) (0.3488) (0.3611) (0.4192)
moral-duty 0.2498 0.4953 −1.8310*** −3.0328*** −2.1755*** −1.3682*** 0.5155
(0.1945) (0.3703) (0.1905) (0.2651) (0.4502) (0.4731) (0.8362)
neighbours-judge 0.6556*** −0.5354*** −0.6231*** −1.4180*** −0.7844*** 0.9265** 1.6727***
(0.1925) (0.1392) (0.1263) (0.1360) (0.2036) (0.3825) (0.4121)
i-judge 1.5256*** −0.6229 −1.5186*** −2.2905*** −1.4214*** −0.4757 1.4660
(0.3413) (0.5000) (0.2658) (0.3312) (0.1937) (0.3931) (0.8635)
everyone-should 0.6247*** 0.3685 −1.8478*** −3.2105*** −2.6071*** −1.5150*** 0.5421
(0.2043) (0.3539) (0.1995) (0.2615) (0.5281) (0.5459) (1.0280)
cost-saving 0.1924 0.1066 −0.7166*** −1.6404*** −1.2210*** −0.4967** 0.3251
(0.1007) (0.1407) (0.0837) (0.1110) (0.2211) (0.2335) (0.2616)
Structural equations
Latent
variable 1
Latent
variable 2
Latent
variable 3
male −0.0793 −0.0802 0.0807
(0.0855) (0.0908) (0.0582)
age 0.0038 −0.2101** −0.1274
(0.1036) (0.0950) (0.0683)
household size −0.0363 0.2207** 0.1681**
(0.0963) (0.0995) (0.0741)
income 0.5645*** 0.2869 0.1246
(0.1097) (0.1607) (0.0802)
satisfied city −0.5305*** −0.2848 −0.2677**
(0.1824) (0.2182) (0.1257)
clean city 0.2912*** 0.2115 0.0761
(0.1090) (0.1305) (0.0708)
ever cleaned −0.2210** −0.0939 −0.1187
(0.0925) (0.0993) (0.0616)
currently sort 0.2103** 0.1414 −0.2344***
(0.1040) (0.1398) (0.0667)
compost −0.3904*** −0.0988 −0.1475**
(0.1047) (0.1066) (0.0695)
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Table 3 continued
Discrete choice model
Main effects Interactions
Means Standard deviations Latent variable 1 Latent variable 2 Latent variable 3
sort2 1.1031*** 0.0000 0.3603 0.6012** −0.3724
(0.1583) (0.0000) (0.2347) (0.2772) (0.2083)
sort5 1.4238*** 1.7691*** 0.2963 0.8735** −1.1883***
(0.1828) (0.2135) (0.3012) (0.4423) (0.2648)
time2 0.5070*** 0.0000 1.3252*** 0.2914 0.7786***
(0.1861) (0.0000) (0.2698) (0.2495) (0.2374)
time4 0.1404 1.0813** 1.5616*** 0.7680*** 0.6271***
(0.1745) (0.4221) (0.4344) (0.2932) (0.2212)
cost −0.0776*** 0.0521*** −0.0006 0.0026 0.0099**
(0.0058) (0.0054) (0.0047) (0.0056) (0.0042)
Model characteristics
Log-likelihood −6237.31
Log-likelihood (constants only) −7841.45
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 0.2046
AIC/n 6.8843
n (observations) 1850
k (parameters) 122
6 Discussion
Consider now the three latent variables identified above in light of the three types of motives
emphasized in our theory model—social pressure, moral motivation, and private costs/effort.
Although the following interpretations may be overly simplistic, let us provide some sugges-
tions of the links between the theoretical and econometric analyses.
Our theory model corresponds to the standard homo oeconomicus model whenever a =
b = 0. LV1 and LV2 both indicate the presence of norm-based motives inconsistent with homo
oeconomicus. LV1 seems to pick up social approval-driven motives to sort, corresponding
to b > 0 and g∗∗ > 0 in the theory model. Similarly, LV2 indicates a mainly moral or
intrinsic motivation to sort, corresponding to a > 0 and g∗ > 0. Brekke et al. (2003) and
Nyborg (2011) propose that g∗, the morally ideal contribution, is increasing in contributions’
perceived social value; this seems nicely consistent with the fact that LV2 is associated with
believing that sorting at home is more thorough than central sorting.
The interpretation of LV3 is somewhat less obvious. Since the monetary cost of waste
contracts is already controlled in the discrete choice part of the econometric model (using
the price attribute on the choice cards), LV3 does not reflect individual cost/effort motives in
general. And even if LV3 is consistent with selfish motives, it cannot readily be interpreted as
such. If one does not think home sorting is better than central sorting, and one finds sorting at
home burdensome, then such an individual may not consider central sorting morally superior;
in the language of the theory model, g∗ = 0. As shown by Table 3, LV3 is associated with not
believing sorting at home is better, and not feeling a moral duty. Even the strongest preference
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for moral conduct—the highest possible a parameter—will not motivate you to sort if you
so not find sorting morally superior, i.e., if g∗ = 0. Consequently, LV3 appears to reflect a
motivation not to sort at home which can be due either to homo oeconomicus preferences, or
to a belief that home sorting is neither morally nor socially superior.
Respondents of the present study prefer, on average, to sort more at home, just like those
of Czajkowski et al. (2014). These results contrast with Bruvoll et al. (2002), who found
that the majority of their sample preferred sorting to be done by a central facility rather than
doing it themselves. In light of the above, it is interesting to note that unlike the present study,
Bruvoll et al. (2002) informed their respondents that “New technology makes it possible to
sort waste centrally so that the environmental effect will be the same”.20 In addition, the
different results may have arisen from a sample selection effect: the Norwegian respondents
in Bruvoll et al. (2002) were questioned as part of an omnibus survey, whereas the participants
in our survey were only questioned about recycling. Clearly, one’s incentives to participate in
a general survey are likely to be different to one’s incentives to participate in a survey about
an environmental issue, so that the sample selection process may have worked differently in
the two studies. The response rate in Bruvoll et al. (2002) was considerably higher than ours,
almost 60 %, which may support this explanation.
7 Conclusions
The motivation for this paper was to investigate the determinants of individuals’ stated pref-
erences for household recycling. In particular, our aim was to throw light on the previous
result of Czajkowski et al. (2014), who found that their respondents preferred, on average,
to sort at home rather than leaving it to a central waste handling facility even at a cost.
A conceptual model is used to show how three types of factors—economic factors affecting
the net costs of recycling; personal moral sentiments; and social pressures—can all contribute
to an individual’s decision over how much to recycle. These factors have all been highlighted
before in the literature, but this paper is, to our knowledge, the first to compare them within
a stated preference, choice experiment setting using an integrated modelling approach.
The conceptual model is then applied to a case study of the preferences of a sample of
Polish households for recycling, as reflected in their stated choices over alternative waste
contracts. The main empirical findings are that, for this sample, many people “want to sort”,
preferring to sort their own household waste even when there is an alternative of getting a
central facility to sort for them.
Due to possible sample selection effects, we cannot guarantee that these results are rep-
resentative for the population at large. However, we find it interesting to explore the factors
underlying the substantial norm-based motivation which appears to be present in our sample.
We find considerable variation underlying the average effects, associated with indicators of
social, moral and economic factors. The main result which emerges is that the willingness to
pay for (and desire to participate in) higher levels of household recycling is mostly linked to
a moral or intrinsic motivation, associated with the belief that sorting at home is in fact more
thorough than sorting at a central facility.
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20 Several other design features may have contributed to the different results: for example, our main questions
were preceded by a couple of questions concerning local street cleanliness and local social engagement, which
may have triggered a feeling that waste is something one should take care of oneself.
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Appendix
Description of the Hybrid Attitudinal Questions Aimed at Discovering
Respondents’ Motivation
All hybrid choice models consist of three parts: a measurement component; a structural
component; and a discrete choice component. Below we describe each part in turn.
Measurement Component
Often, psychological factors which influence individual behaviour cannot be measured in a
direct way, unlike individual characteristics such as age and gender. Instead a researcher must
use various indicator (measurement) questions in a survey, the responses to which could be
expected to be determined by latent variables which are indicators of psychological traits or
beliefs.
Modelling choices for the indicator equations depend on the particular application.21 In
this paper our indicators were measured on 5-point Likert scales—the measurement equa-
tions are therefore modelled using ordered probit models. Formally, for Ii ordered indicator
variables the measurement component of the hybrid choice model can be specified as:
I∗i = ′LVi + ηi , (6)
where  is a matrix of coefficients of individual specific latent variables LVi , and ηi denotes
a vector of error terms assumed to come from a multivariate normal distribution with 0 means
and identity covariance matrix. Under this specification, the relationship between Iil and I ∗il
(for the l-th indicator variable which takes J possible, ordered values) becomes:
Iil = 1, if I ∗il < α1l
...
...
...
Iil = k, if αk−1l ≤ I ∗il < αkl
...
...
...
Iil = J, if αJ−1l ≤ I ∗il
, (7)
where the α’s are the threshold parameters to be estimated for each indicator. This specifica-
tion leads to the well-known ordered probit likelihood form for Ii :
P (Ii |LVi ,,α) =
L∏
l=1
(P (Iil |LVi ,l , αl )) =
L∏
l=1
(

(
αkl − ′l LVi
) −  (αk−1l − ′l LVi
))
,
(8)
where (·) denotes the normal cdf, l and αl are l-th row of the  matrix and the vector of
thresholds parameters for l-th indicator variable, respectively.
21 Many early hybrid choice model applications used a simple, linear regression even in cases where the
dependent variable was clearly ordered (Daly et al. 2012).
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Structural Component
We assume that the latent variables in (6) depend on some socio-demographic variables which
are stacked in a vector Xstri . This relationship can be described by the following structural
equations:
LVi =  ′Xstri + ξi , (9)
with  representing a matrix of coefficients and error terms ξi which are assumed to come
from a multivariate normal distribution with 0 mean and a diagonal covariance matrix.
Discrete Choice Component
The theoretical foundation for the discrete choice model is random utility theory, which
assumes that the utility a person derives depends on observed characteristics and unobserved
idiosyncrasies, represented by a stochastic component (McFadden 1974). As a result, indi-
vidual i’s utility resulting from choosing the alternative j in choice set t can be expressed
as:
Vi jt = β′iXi j t + ei j t , (10)
where the utility expression is a function of alternative attributes Xi j t ; the associated
coefficients βi ; and a stochastic component ei j t allowing for factors not observed by the
econometrician to affect individuals’ utility and choices. Note that βi are individual-specific,
thus allowing for heterogeneous preferences amongst respondents and leading to a hybrid
mixed logit model (HMXL).22 Assuming that parameters are the same for all respondents
implies homogenous preferences and leads to the hybrid multinomial logit model (HMNL).
In our HMNL and HMXL model we also assume that the random parameters βi depend
on latent variables LVi , related to respondents’ beliefs and attitudes towards recycling. The
functional form of this dependence is assumed to be of the form:
βi = ′LVi + β∗i , (11)
where  is a matrix of coefficients to estimate and β∗i has a multivariate normal distribution
with vector of means and covariance matrix to be estimated.23
As a result, the conditional probability of individual i’s choices is given by:
P(yi |Xi , β∗i , LVi ,) =
Ti∏
t=1
exp
(
β′iXi j t
)
C∑
k=1
exp
(
β′iXikt
)
(12)
Estimation and Identification of the Model
After combining Eqs. (8) and (12) we obtain the full-information likelihood for our HMNL
or HMXL model, where for ease of exposition we stack the parameter vectors ,, into
the single vector :
Li =
∫
P
(
yi |Xi , Xstri , β∗i , ξi ,
)
P
(
Ii |Xstri , ξi ,
)
f
(
β∗i , ξi |θ
)
d
(
β∗i , ξi
)
(13)
22 Is it typically assumed that individual parameters follow a particular distribution (possibly multivariate
distribution allowing for non-zero correlation of model parameters), rather than being separately estimated
for each individual.
23  has number of columns equal to the number of latent variables and the number of rows equal to the
number of attributes.
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As random disturbances of β∗i as well as error terms in structural equations ξi are not directly
observed they must be integrated out of the conditional likelihood. This multidimensional
integral can be approximated using a simulated maximum likelihood approach.
Identification
In order to make identification of hybrid choice models possible, the scale of a latent variable
needs to be normalized (Daly et al. 2012). This can be done by normalizing the variances
of the error terms in the structural equations or by normalizing some coefficients in the 
matrix for each latent variable. Raveau et al. (2012) argue that normalizing variances leads
to smaller bias, and this is the approach we adopt here. We normalize latent variables to
have variance equal one (LV normik = LVik/std (LVk))24 which leads to setting the k-th row
of  matrix to normk = k/std (LVk) and the standard deviation of k-th error term as
std (ξik) = 1/std (LVk).
Unfortunately it is not known if this condition is sufficient—the identification depends
on the number of latent variables and measurement equations. To assure credibility of our
results we followed Bollen and Davis (2009) to ensure the necessary conditions hold for
identification of structural equation models. In addition, we tested our model by running
simulations—we generated artificial datasets and validated our model by recovering the
underlying parameters. Our model encountered no problems in identification and produces
stable results.
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